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The Reluctant Feminist: Angela Merkel and the 
Modernization of Gender Politics in Germany
JOYCE MARIE MUSHABEN
The adoption of female suffrage across multiple western nations in the early 1900s 
was accompanied by the expectation that women’s ability to vote would eventually 
lead to their direct involvement in governance. It was further assumed that by boosting 
more of their own kind into positions of power, female suffrage could and would make 
a significant difference in the laws and policies being adopted, thus allowing women 
to shape their own lives (cf. Cress in this volume). The last 100 years have unfortunate ly 
supplied much evidence to the contrary, leading countless scholars to investigate 
women’s irregular paths to power, the institutional barriers they face, the stereotypical 
role expectations that hinder their progress, and new mechanisms seeking to equalize 
their participation in politics (in Germany: Davidson-Schmich 2016; Kolinsky 1991; 
Roll 2005; Scholz 2007; Clemens 2006).1 These studies, in turn, have led us to theorize 
about different types of representation in an effort to explain when, where and how 
more women in politics might generate better, far-reaching policies for women. 
Female suffrage may be a necessary condition, but it is clearly not a sufficient one 
in fostering gender equality. The 100th anniversary of women’s right to vote in Ger-
many (cf. Abels 2011) provides a unique opportunity to re-assess the metrics schol-
ars use to determine whether the politicians female voters help to elect do, in fact, 
adopt policies enhancing the balanced participation of women and men in public 
life (Carless 1998; Geissel 2000). While many comparativists focus on the quan-
titative dimensions, known as descriptive representation (the number of women in 
powerful positions), few present direct evidence that female leadership has, or has 
not (Beckett 2006) induced qualitative reforms, labeled substantive representation. 
Finding empirical measures for the latter is a lot harder, insofar as many policies 
can take years simply to produce a level playing field, much less equitable societal 
outcomes. The ability to introduce gender-sensitive policies moreover depends on a 
wide array of structural factors, e.g. shifting party coalitions or economic crises, that 
cannot be held constant in real-world settings. Case studies often provide the best op-
portunity for establishing causal links between the presence of women in politics and 
adoption of better policies for women (von Wahl 2011; Wiliarty 2010; Yoder 2011).
Based on a much longer study of Germany’s first female Chancellor (Mushaben 
2017) this brief essay analyzes the extent to which Angela Merkel has used her 
pow er to advance gender equality since 2005. In other words: Can one woman really 
make a difference? I argue that despite her Christian-Democratic affiliation, Merkel 
has indeed done more to foster equality than all previous German chancellors com-
bined, although she refuses to label herself a feminist. 
Of course, there is no way to prove that her sex alone accounts for major policy 
changes; curiously, no one ever raises this question in relation to male leaders, sug-
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gesting a double standard even on the part of gender scholars. But if we are serious 
about recognizing intersectionality, we cannot deny that gender is a core variable in 
most decision-making contexts (Lombardo/Agustin 2011). Re-elected for the fourth 
time in 2017, Merkel has faced different coalition configurations, complicated by 
serious personality conflicts among her Cabinet members. Her many years in of-
fice nevertheless provide a solid foundation for observing not only changing laws 
but also medium-term policy outcomes. The fact that this Chancellor may have had 
“non-feminist” motives for introducing gender-sensitive policies does not detract 
from the real, everyday improvements engendered by these reforms.
I first explore key reasons hindering Merkel’s public identification with feminism, 
which critics erroneously use to downplay her contributions to gender equality. One 
needs to recall that Merkel spent the first 35 years of her life under an eastern gender 
regime that differed significantly from the postwar Kinder-Küche-Kirche paradigm 
shaping West Germany through 1989. Given the long-standing conflicts among dif-
ferent schools of western feminism (liberal, socialist, radical-autonomous, wom-
anist) over the years (Mushaben 1989), she would probably be “damned if she did, 
damned if she didn’t” identify with one type over the other. I then outline legislative 
changes that can be ascribed to descriptive and substantive representation, respec-
tively. I conclude with a few policies that I attribute to a third category of electoral 
impact, transformational representation.
Playing the Feminist Card at the Women20 Summit
Anticipating her role as president of the 2017 G-20 summit meeting, Angela Merkel 
tasked the Deutscher Frauenrat and the Verband Deutscher Unternehmerinnen in 
2016 with organizing the Women20 (W20) Dialogue. Established under the Turk-
ish presidency in 2015, the W20 became an official G20 “engagement group,” lob-
bying for the inclusion of female economic empowerment world-wide.2 The pur-
ported high-point in 2017 was a Berlin panel discussion on April 25, titled “Inspiring 
Women: Scaling up Women’s Entrepreneurship.” Participants included German 
Chancellor Merkel, Dutch Queen Máxima, Canadian foreign minister Chrystia Free-
land, IMF director Christine Lagarde, Bank of America CEO Anne Finucane, “first 
daughter” Ivanka Trump, Kenian high-tech entrepreneur Juliana Rotich und Nicola 
Leibinger-Kammüller, CEO of Trumpf GmbH. Wirtschaftswoche publisher Miriam 
Meckel moderated the discussion. 
Towards the end of the session, moderator Meckel asked the participants whether 
they considered themselves feminists. Lagarde immediately raised her hand; Trump 
encouraged the audience to applaud but was jeered when she finally waved hers as 
well. Merkel’s hesitation led Meckel to ask her point-blank, “are you a feminist?” 
She replied hesitantly: 
Ehrlich gesagt, ähm, möchte ich (…). Also, die Geschichte des Feminismus ist eine, bei 
der es gibt Gemeinsamkeiten mit mir, und (...) auch solche wo ich sagen würde, es gibt 
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auch Unterschiede. Und ich möchte mich nicht mit einem Titel schmücken, den ich gar 
nicht habe (…), denn Alice Schwarzer und so, die haben ganz schwere Kämpfe gekämpft, 
und jetzt komm‘ ich und setzte mich auf die Erfolge und sage, “ich bin Feministin. Das ist 
aber toll (…).” Ich habe keine Angst, wenn Sie finden, dass ich eine bin – dann stimmen 
Sie ab (...). Aber ich möchte mich nicht mit der Feder schmücken.3
The clip went more or less viral, without anyone noticing that Leibinger-Kammüller 
also remained silent.
This was not the first time that Merkel had publicly refused to embrace the feminist 
label, even though the “World’s Most Powerful Women” eleven times over has 
faced a never-ending barrage of sexist tributes, ranging from endless hairdo monta-
ges, a Merkel Barbie-Doll, comic books and animated dance-videos, to a Blazer 
Watch and pants-suit jokes (Mushaben 2017; Schramm 2016). The evening-gown 
she wore to the Oslo Opera House in 2008 unleashed a wave of offensive cleavage-
commentaries, e.g., the UK tabloid headlines, “Merkel’s Weapons of Mass Distrac-
tion” and “Deutschland boober alles” (Der Spiegel, April 14, 2008). Pundits have 
called her everything from Kohl’s Girl, Joan of Arc, the Iron Maiden, Father-Killer, 
Angie the Sleeper and the Black Widow Spider, to Maggie Merkel, die Trümmer-
frau, Alice in Wunderland, Mrs. Cool, the Alpha-Kanzlerin, the Power-Physicist, 
Merkiavelli and that all-time French favorite, Madam Non (Mushaben 2017).4 She 
has graced countless magazine covers drawing on Terminator, Muslim, Nazi, 
Moth er Teresa and Mutti images. Although most labels seem to downplay her 
strength as a female leader, their gendered nature suggests just the opposite. Over 
time the Chancellor has learned that her best defense against sexist onslaughts is to 
combat them with humor. 
As Germany’s first eastern female chancellor, Merkel’s status as a double-outsider 
forced her to make up and play by her own leadership rules, ironically rendering her 
the embodiment of the feminist mantra, “the personal is the political.” Her unusual 
socialization experiences have had a cumulative impact on her performance, but 
one can still discern instances in which one factor prevails over others. Whereas 
Merkel’s east-to-west re-acculturation exerts influence over policy substance, her 
upbringing as a pastor’s daughter in a “godless” state drives a strong commitment 
to human rights and freedom-of-movement norms. Gender influences, combined 
with her post-GDR antipathy towards confrontational, ideological positions factor 
into her leadership style (Eagly/Johannesen-Schmidt 2011; Glaesner 2009). The 
physicist, meanwhile, is clearly at work in matters of program design and evalu-
ation. My study of Merkel’s career trajectory since 1990 leads me to stress three 
factors shaping her reluctance to embrace the feminist label: a desire to position 
herself between the antithetical nature of eastern and western gender regimes from 
1949 to 1989; her time-tested method of “learning by doing”; and her preference for 
pragmatic problem-solving over ideological party-principles. 
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A Tale of Two Feminisms
The Kohl government deliberately relegated “women’s issues” to the back burner 
throughout the unification negotiations, despite impressive feminist mobilization in 
the east (Ritter 2007). Rather than import foreign workers, GDR leaders had responded 
to a dramatic postwar labor shortage by opening educational and occupational doors 
to its own women. More pro-natalist than egalitarian in nature, SED policies helped to 
reconcile work-and-family obligations for women after 1971, though they did nothing 
to redefine the gender division of labor (Kolinsky/Nickel 2003; Voth/Kootz 1990). 
GDR women had benefited from “emancipatory” policies that FRG feminists lacked, 
i.e., free contraception, legal abortion, generous leave policies, comprehensive child-
care and access to non-traditional professions (Bergahn/Fritzsche 1991). Internally di-
vided, western feminists were too busy critiquing patriarchy, and each other, to pursue 
pragmatic, single-issue coalitions (Mushaben 1989; Young 1999). Defeated in their 
efforts to secure legal abortion, and frustrated by cultural misunderstandings, both 
groups returned to their separate niches within a few years, with feelings of betrayal 
on both sides (Mushaben 1995; Miethe 2014; Rohnstock 1994; Unabhängiger Frau-
enverband 1990). Given her GDR socialization and her physics career, one can un-
derstand Merkel’s hesitation to view women’s paid employment and state-supported 
child-care as radically “feminist” demands. Nor she was looking to exchange one 
“ism” for another, after “35 years in the waiting room of democracy” (Grunenberg 
2000). As the leader of united Germany, Merkel could not identify with one feminist 
school without alienating the other. Ironically, the EU-mandated reconciliation poli-
cies which she introduced after 2005 – deliberately blocked by her SPD predecessor 
– strongly resembled GDR policies eliminated by unification (Lang 2017). 
A political neophyte in 1990, Merkel’s first two Cabinet portfolios covered areas 
conservatives had always loved to hate: women’s rights and environmental protec-
tion. Socialized in a system in which over 90% had been working mothers, compared 
to only 60% among western Baby Boomers (Mushaben 1995; Winkler 1990, 108-
113), the eastern physicist was pressured from all sides regarding reproductive rights. 
Few realized at the time that former Chancellor Kohl had already turned primary 
responsibility for abortion legislation over to the Justice and Health Ministries 
 (Mushaben 1997). Recovering from a broken leg in 1992, which she characterized 
as “lucky break,” Merkel found time to read about, discuss and grasp the conflicting 
gender expectations invoked by her appointment, even among CDU/CSU women: 
“Naturally ... it’s not easy for many women in my own caucus who are older than I 
to accept my approach to women’s policies ... Many had plowed through and 
struggled for 10, 15 years, then German unification came and suddenly I’m sitting in 
the armchair as the Women’s Minister” (quoted in: Koelbl 1999, 52). Her W20 
 comments mirror her earlier reluctance to claim credit for what other women had 
achieved; they also reflect her desire to avoid ideological stances, based on her GDR 
upbringing and her physics-driven preference for data-based policies.
02_FP_02_18_Schwerpunkt.indd   86 05.11.2018   08:47:27
100 JAHRE FRAUENWAHLRECHT – UND WO BLEIBT DIE GLEICHHEIT?
FEMINA POLITICA 2 | 2018 87
Evidence-based Learning
A second factor shaping Merkel’s reluctance to identify as a feminist owes to her pro-
clivity for “learning by doing,” known to natural scientists as the trial-and-error ap-
proach. As a non-feminist Women’s Minister, she initially “wanted nothing to do with 
quotas” which she saw as “degrading and defamatory.” She changed her mind after 
observing the barriers women faced in her own party, voting for a CDU “quorum” in 
1994. Merkel also initially rejected corporate boardroom quotas demanded by Labor 
Minister Ursula von der Leyen in 2011. Forced to clean up the Euro-crisis mess cre-
ated by unsupervised males dominating global finance, she reversed her position in 
2014, accepting mandatory 30% targets after studies demonstrated that “voluntary” 
quotas had failed to increase women’s presence on supervisory boards among major 
businesses and DAX firms. Studies cited in EU fact-sheets also showed that women’s 
presence on corporate boards tends to increase company earnings (cf. European Com-
mission 2016), a fact that would not have escaped a data-driven Chancellor.
Although she refused to play the gender card during her first two election campaigns 
(Mushaben 2018; Merkle 2015; Scholz 2007), the Chancellor now admits to having 
been disadvantaged as a female politician (Koelbl 1999; Lau 2009). She perceived 
the self-serving, tough-guy behavior of western politicians in the Cabinet as “un-
pleasant.” When she tried to outlaw sexual harassment at the workplace and to fill 
half of all civil service positions with women – as foreseen by the unification treaty 
– CSU Carl-Dieter Spranger told Merkel, “You know, girl, if I didn’t find you so 
nice, I wouldn’t vote for any of this rubbish” (quoted in: Lau 2009, 53). Despite her 
physics background, she noted that “many thought because I was a woman I didn’t 
know what I was talking about (as Environmental Minister) (...) since I lacked a deep 
male voice and a big physique” (quoted in: Koelbl 1999, 55-56). In one case, she 
was pushed to tears over her proposed Ozone Law, but she turned it to her advantage: 
“They weren’t used to me having an emotional outbreak since I didn’t shout like the 
men (...) but it helped. I probably wouldn’t have gotten a (Cabinet) majority without 
it” (quoted in: Koelbl 1999, 54-55). 
Her gendered learning experiences did not stop there. In 1998, conservative hard-
liners including Catholic Archbishop Meisner pushed her to marry her partner of 
seventeen years, Joachim Sauer, prior to becoming CDU General-Secretary. For-
mer pastor Joachim Gauck faced few if any pressures regarding his unsanctified 
relationship with Daniela Schadt when he became Federal-President. Or consider 
Merkel’s response to Gerhard Schröder, SPD Minister-President of Niedersachsen, 
who invited her to negotiate over nuclear waste storage, then immediately leaked 
their discussion. Figuring out the “constants” in male political behavior, she struck 
back in 1997, finding a way to pass the Nuclear Law without Länder consent. Schrö-
der, she noted, “just can’t stand it when a woman, in particular, manages to ruin his 
game. He’s not very good at accepting failure” (quoted in: Koelbl 1999, 58). During 
the 2005 campaign, he tried to deny her the Chancellorship by using Doris Schröder-
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Köpf to declare that “a childless female leader” would be incapable of producing 
good family policies. Never mind the fact that the latter’s status as Schröder’s fourth 
wife suggested that he knew even less about stable family relations.5 Merkel’s ability 
to observe first, follow the rules and strike later also served her well in eliminating 
core male rivals who comprised the so-called Andes Pact. 
A further example of learning-by-doing stems from Merkel’s days as an unloved envi-
ronmental minister. Although she initially backed the nuclear energy industry, the castor 
transport scandal (1994-1995) taught her not to trust its routine safety pronouncements. 
Given her working knowledge of the industry’s minimal insurance coverage (1%) in the 
event of a German melt-down (Hennicke/Welfens 2012), the former physicist was the 
only leader beyond Japanese prime minister Naoto Kan who could read the atomic tea 
leaves after Fukushima. Her decision to shut down of all atomic reactors by 2022 was 
data-driven but also tied to her recognition of the cost of “human error.”
Progressive Principles versus Pragmatic Problem-Solving 
Some feminist critics maintain that their first female Chancellor adopted certain 
gender-friendly policies largely to advance the electoral fortunes of her own party, 
but that is exactly what politicians are expected to do in democratic societies. They 
do not explain why she pursued such policies despite formidable resistance within 
the CDU/CSU caucus. Throughout the lackluster 2017 election campaign, the three-
time Chancellor was singularly blamed not only for the rise of the AfD (due to her 
strong stance on asylum) but also for her “anti-democratic depoliticization” of many 
contentious issue debates. This raises the counter-question: Why did the SPD-Green 
government not adopt reforms that its own voters wanted, in order to shore up that 
coalition’s re-election prospects? 
While the Greens indirectly welcomed Merkel’s take-over of “their” issues (reflected 
in their willingness to join a Jamaica Coalition), the SPD remains deeply divided 
over its “stolen” identity after two Grand Coalitions. In fact, Chancellor Schröder 
personally blocked many of the equality initiatives championed by his female Cabi-
net members, 1998-2005. In addition to embracing Harz IV reforms which expanded 
the low-wage, female “precariat,” Red-Green legalization of prostitution contributed 
to documented increases in “wellness-brothels,” flat-rate sexploitation and human 
trafficking (Meyer et al. 2013). That government likewise failed to enact a bona-fide 
immigration law, much less EU-mandated anti-discrimination and reconciliation pol-
icies. Although the Greens count gender equality among their four core pillars, they 
did not mobilize grassroots support to counter Schröder’s (or Schily’s) vetoes; it is 
hard to justify the charge that Merkel stole their issues, given that these allegedly pro-
equality parties had refused to act on their own principles for seven years. 
By contrast, Merkel’s first Grand Coalition finally adopted the Allgemeine Gleichbe-
handlungsgesetz in 2006 and created a federal office to monitor discrimination. Her 
2007 National Integration Plan, added to further migration and asylum reforms through 
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2013 (Mushaben 2017), included significant “implementation monitoring” mecha-
nisms. Although she voted against the Ehe für Alle act in 2017, the Chancellor (having 
“done the math”), allowed CDU parliamentarians to vote their conscience, securing a 
clear majority for that bill. She has pushed the Union as a whole to break with the tra-
dition of “Kinder, Küche, Kirche”, going so far as to adopt a liberal trans sex ual-rights 
law (Davidson-Schmich 2017). She has also accorded “Chefsache”  status to programs 
increasing female and ethnic minority presence in MINT/STEM fields. Though she 
does not deserve all of the credit, Merkel’s leadership style has produced some amaz-
ing results, especially in comparison to the Kohl and Schröder legacies. 
Revisiting the Metrics of Representation 
Concentrating on women’s numerical presence, descriptive representation is usually 
measured in parliamentary terms; it assumes that sex-based stereotypes and male-
normed policies will wither away once they women reach critical-mass, roughly 30% 
(Dahlerup 1988). Women had already crossed that threshold before Merkel became 
Chancellor, but their share rose slightly from 31.8% (2005), to 33.4% (2009), then to 
37% (2013). After the 2017 elections, their share of seats fell to 30.9%. The parties that 
rail the loudest against Merkel’s policies evince the smallest female delegations, viz. 
the AfD (10 of 92 seats), the FDP (19 of 80) and the CSU (8 of 47). AfD and FDP gains, 
along with SPD losses, explain most of the decline (cf. Deutscher Bundestag 2017).
Confined to legislative bodies, descriptive-data tell us little about potentially pow-
erful women behind the scenes, raising the question: Has Merkel’s staying-power 
since 2005 chipped away at gender imbalances within the executive branch (Annes-
ley/Gains 2010)? Collectively derided as Girls’ Camp, Merkel’s inner circle includes 
savvy female politicians, powerful media moguls as well as discrete, reform-orient ed 
men. Women comprise nearly 50% of the Federal Chancellor’s Office staff, half of 
whom were under 40 in 2008. The total number of women present in Merkel’s first 
three Cabinets ranged from six to eight; she promised women 50% of the portfolios 
as of 2017. Ursula von der Leyen’s appointment as Germany’s first female defense 
minister in late 2013 is particularly noteworthy, as is Merkel’s annual Girls’ Day 
meeting with young women at the Chancellery.
Increasing women’s numerical strength is ultimately a function of “all things being 
equal,” which they usually aren’t, obliging us to consider Merkel polices that level 
the societal playing field. Substantive representation pertains to women’s ability to 
reshape legislated policies, beyond the presumption that they are “natural” experts in 
health, education, welfare and family matters. While Merkel avoided gender themes 
during her first two campaigns, she declared in May 2013 that real equality will only 
be achieved “when both men and women change their roles and behaviors.”6 Over 
three terms she has expanded paternal leave and child-care guarantees to such an ex-
tent that Germany is experiencing its first Baby Boom in decades; the current supply 
of midwives and care-places lags well behind the demand (Heine 2017). 
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Obviously, improved leave- and care-options do not constitute a primary reason for 
producing children, but they can affect the timing of such decisions, along with pro-
motion prospects and pensions for women in paid employment. Of the 19 (out of 
450) aides who gave birth during Schröder’s last 35 months in office, few returned to 
work. There were 49 births during Merkel’s first 32 months, most of whom resumed 
their posts under family leave options enacted in 2007 under a childless CDU chief. 
They included Hildegard Müller, the first State-Secretary to return to this office since 
1949. The pool of eligibles for high administrative office has expanded accordingly. 
The general share of female employment has risen over 10% since 2005, and more 
women than ever before are living off their own wages across united Germany: from 
64% in 2006, up to 72% in 2016 (Destatis 2016, 6ff). 
While her holistic, data-driven approach may not meet all the formal criteria 
associat ed with EU gender mainstreaming, Merkel’s contributions to equality at 
home have certainly outpaced those of the Barroso and Juncker Commissions. Many 
women beyond Germany’s borders have experienced less positive outcomes under 
austerity policies, however, leading us back to the W20/G20 summit. 
Words vs. Deeds: Transformational Representation
Transformative representation, as I define it, seeks to establish strategic parameters 
for future changes, as opposed to responding to women’s everyday survival needs. 
Justified or not, the 400 delegates attending the 2017 W20 summit expected a more 
pro-active response from a female Chancellor than they had from the Turkish and 
Chinese prime ministers hosting earlier G20 meetings. During the April 25th panel 
discussion, Ivanka Trump declared that her father had “made everything possible” 
for her. In a gender-equal society, a woman would not need either her father’s help or 
a $50 million trust fund to shape her own life. Nor would a real feminist directly ex-
ploit poor female workers in Chinese factories licensed to produce her clothing line 
(Harwell 2017). Self-proclaimed feminist Christine Lagarde became the first woman 
to head the IMF, having been appointed in the wake of a major sex scandal involving 
her predecessor, Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Although Lagarde has reportedly intro-
duced policies to enhance women’s status within her own organization, her IMF-
austerity policies have had a devastating impact on less privileged women’s lives 
across the Euro-zone (cf. Elomäki 2012; Rubery/Karamessini 2013), suggesting her 
limited “feminist” grasp of descriptive versus substantive representation. 
Reluctant to take credit for hard work of earlier movements, the German Chancellor 
delivered a speech at the gala G20 reception, then accepted the Final Communiqué of 
the 2017 W20-Dialog Process which, for the first time, has its own section in the larger 
G20 Final Communiqué. It recommends three specific programs: the #eSkills4Girls in-
itiative, the Women Entrepreneurs Financing Initiative (We-Fi), and the formation of a 
Women’s Business Leaders’ task force. The Germany 2017 Implementation Plan more-
over includes concrete “dashboards,” timetables and indicators, based on a wide array 
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of UN, OECD, ILO, IMF and World Bank statistical reports (see W20 Box). It further 
calls for W20 access to “mainstream” G20 negotiation tracks and “Sherpa meetings.”
Women20 Germany 2017 Communiqué (Excerpts)
26th April 2017, Berlin, Germany
Putting Gender Equality at the Core of the G20
We, the representatives of the 2017 Women20 (W20) network, are convinced that the G20’s 
goal of inclusive and sustainable economic growth in an interconnected world will not be 
achieved without the G20’s commitment to women’s economic empowerment by means 
of the following targets: (a) full property rights, legal capacity, right to self-determination 
for women and girls and their effective protection from violence; (b) full access to 
quality education for girls and women, with special attention on technical and vocational 
education, e-skills and lifelong learning opportunities; (c) full access on equal terms to 
productive and financial resources for women; (d) full access to labour markets and decent 
working conditions for men and women, implementing the G20 Job Quality Framework; 
(e) equal pay and pension rights for equal and equivalent work; (f) GDP measurement and 
fair redistribution of unpaid domestic and care work, including more investment in the 
provision of infrastructure and public services, and; (g) equitable representation of women 
in decision-making positions with that of men.
G20 policies tend to be gender-blind, but they are not automatically gender-neutral in their 
outcome. Accordingly: 
1. The W20 calls on the G20 member states to systematically integrate gender analysis and 
gender budgeting into all its agenda, growth strategy and policy frameworks (...). 
2. The W20 urges the G20 to advance member state policies towards the ‘25 by 25’ target 
set by G20 for reducing the gender labour participation gap, resulting in a 25 per cent 
improvement by 2025, by putting forward national plans of actions and monitoring its 
progress with support from the OECD and the ILO. 
 3. The W20 recommends that the G20 supports women entrepreneurs and female 
cooperatives to start up and scale their operations, build capacity, ensure their equal 
access to finance and markets, and accord them their fair share in global value chains. 
 4. The W20 calls on the G20 to swiftly bridge the widening digital gender divide and take 
inspiration from the ‘Women’s Initiative in Developing STEM Career (WINDS)’ by setting up 
a comprehensive 5-year plan for gender-equal digital transformation, thereby partnering 
with ‘EQUALS’, an initiative implemented by the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), the GSM Association (GSMA) and UN Women. 
5. The W20 calls on the G20’s Presidencies to ensure access to the G20 negotiation tracks 
and G20 Sherpa meetings. 
Source: http://www.w20-germany.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/W20_
Communique_Final.pdf
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Granting women the right to vote, then electing more women to formulate and exe-
cute the law of the land, are only the first two steps in a long process Max Weber 
(1919) once defined as “the slow boring of hard boards.” The feminist movement 
itself has undergone a long learning process, moving first from demands for equal 
treatment, to positive action, to gender mainstreaming, and then to factoring in di-
versity and intersectionality (Woodward 2012). Orthodox feminist theories are often 
at odds with political realities, which necessitate broader issue coalitions, partisan 
compromises and a heavy dose of pragmatism. Merkel’s mixed motives for pursuing 
equality policies (e.g., in response to Germany’s demographic deficit) has allowed 
her to pull together new stakeholder groups, who increasingly recognize the benefits 
of integrating women and minorities into the work-force. While corporations may 
initially view gender-sensitive policies in instrumental terms, these reforms develop 
a life of their own, leading to other transformations across society – as even GDR 
leaders had to recognize.
I recall many personal discussions with German feminists during the 1970s and 
1980s, who regularly insisted on the need for a Gesamtkonzept; the problem then 
arose as to which school of feminism would be able to impose its comprehensive 
approach on all of the others. This either/or thinking probably had its roots in the 
male-normed polarization of the late 1960s. The fall of the Wall re-incited this type 
of debate between western and eastern feminists, while (mostly western) men im-
mediately set out to claim the best jobs, the biggest Treuhand subsidies and the tops 
jobs in eastern Länder governments (exception: Manfred Stolpe in Brandenburg). 
GDR-women were hit with mass unemployment, the loss of legal abortion and the 
elimination of full-time child-care facilities, while more privileged women argued 
over whose feminism was best. 
Having devoted my entire career to pursuing various forms of gender equality, I have 
come to the following conclusion: There is a proper place for feminist theorizing, 
conceptual reflection and strategic mobilization, but sometimes single-issue coali-
tions offer the shortest path to legislative success. The less time we spend worrying 
about labels, or about who really “qualifies” as a feminist, the more time we have to 
engage in critical policy analysis, to be shared with women who attain high office, so 
that they can induce data-driven structural change. My investigation of Merkel’s pol-
icy performance since 2005 has persuaded me that a woman leader need not openly 
and regularly declare herself a feminist in order to make a difference. In this case, I 
concur with another surprising pragmatist from the east, Deng Xiao-ping, who noted 
in 1979, “it does not matter if the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.”
Notes
1 All but one of the books written about Angela Merkel auf deutsch to date have been compiled 
by journalists. The better ones include Heckel (2009), Lau (2009), Kornelius (2013), Müller-
Vogg (2005) and Roll (2005).
2  For details, see the official German website, http://www.w20-germany.org and http://g20.org.
tr/engagement-groups/women-20-w20/ (30.8.2018)
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3  See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQ-sV97bGIE (30.8.2018)
4  This is only a partial list, granting Merkel the dubious distinction of having had more deroga-
tory, gender-oriented nicknames applied in a shorter period than is true of any of her succes-
sors, based on my own search. 
5 For the record: They divorced after 2016 when Doris learned about his affair with a younger 
Korean business-woman through the media.
6  She made this statement during an hour-long interview sponsored by a women’s magazine; 
see Brigitte Talk, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9v-1W58s4e8, posted on May 18, 2013.
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Ausschluss trotz Einschluss. Ungleiche 
Handlungsressourcen von Bürgermeisterinnen und 
Bürgermeistern
UTA KLETZING
Frauen in der Politik sind nicht mehr die Ausnahme, aber noch längst nicht die 
Regel. In keinem Parlament Deutschlands seit 1919 sind Frauen gleichberechtigt 
vertreten gewesen.1 Auf der kommunalen Ebene sieht die Frauenrepräsentanz mit 
durchschnittlich etwa einem Viertel Mandatsträgerinnen sowie mit rund einem 
Zehntel (Ober-)Bürgermeisterinnen und Landrätinnen am rückständigsten aus. In 
den Landtagen sind durchschnittlich etwa ein Drittel der Mandate in Frauenhand, 
allerdings mit einer hohen Spannbreite zwischen etwa 41% und etwa 25%. Minister-
präsidentinnen gibt es aktuell zwei, und Deutschland hatte bislang insgesamt sechs. 
Der höchste Frauenanteil, den der Deutsche Bundestag je vorweisen konnte, lag bei 
37% – und zwar in der letzten Legislaturperiode. Der Rückgang auf 30,9% Frauen 
https://doi.org/10.3224/feminapolitica.v27i2.08
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